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SPECIALIZATION HAS THE POTENTIAL TO LEAD TO UNEVEN JUSTICE:
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES IN THE JUVENILE & DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURTS
By: Allison Cleveland 1
Rather than focus on process and precedent, 
problem-solving justice focuses on the 
outcome. Problem solving courts are 
“specialized courts that seek to respond to 
persistent social, human, and legal problems, 
such as addiction, family dysfunction, 
domestic violence, mental illness, and quality-
of-life crime.” These courts adapt their 
processes to suit the sources of  the problems, 
which are driving the actions that bring the 
wrongdoer to court in the fi rst place. The 
focus is on the individual, and the courts 
provide particularized responses designed 
to change that specifi c offender’s future 
behavior.
                          - Kathryn C. Sammons2
I. Introduction 
In October of  this year, I observed an initial hearing 
at the Boston Juvenile Court for a care and protection case 
involving four children, all less than fi ve years of  age.3  The 
Massachusetts Department of  Children and Families (“DCF”) 
presented evidence that the mother used cocaine during her 
pregnancy with the youngest of  the four children–a newborn. 
This was the entirety of  the DCF case.  The other three children 
were present at the hearing and appeared to be very happy, 
energetic, and well-cared for.  Though the children’s mother 
and father did not live together, they still saw each other socially 
and coordinated child care.  Counsel for the mother argued 
that the DCF presented no nexus between the mother’s drug 
use and her ability to care for her older children. The older 
children, reasoned the mother’s counsel, should therefore 
remain in her care.  The judge reviewed documents submitted 
into evidence and came to the father’s criminal record.  Noting 
multiple restraining orders against the father for domestic 
abuse, the judge voiced concern about the mother’s failure to 
separate herself  from a man with such an extensive history of  
domestic abuse. Accordingly, the judge ordered DCF to take 
custody of  all four children.
Following the hearing, I spoke with another juvenile 
court judge.  I admitted my surprise that all four children were 
removed from their mother’s home based on their father’s 
violent history against women.  The judge was not surprised 
by the outcome and voiced his strong feeling that the outcome 
was correct.  He noted that, based on the fi rm language used 
by the Supreme Judicial Court in Custody of  Vaughn,4 juvenile 
court judges take no risks in situations involving domestic 
abuse. The court would rather remove a child from his or her 
partner violence is enough to remove children from the home. 
He underscored the harm that he believes can be done to a 
child by simply observing abuse and his belief  that mothers 
are not likely to escape the cycle of  intimate partner violence. 
In the ensuing weeks, I observed more cases in 
which children were removed from their families and placed 
into DCF custody based largely on the mother’s status as a 
domestic violence victim.  These decisions continued to strike 
me.  Would the outcome be different in other courts? Would 
the outcome differ, specifi cally, in courts that specialize in 
domestic violence cases?
This paper examines the ways in which judges in the 
juvenile and domestic violence courts have dealt with, and are 
likely to deal with, cases of  intimate partner violence where 
children live in the household. Specifi cally, this paper suggests 
that the divergent goals of  these two specialty courts likely 
result in uneven justice.  In juvenile courts, a judge’s focus is on 
the welfare of  the child. Consequently, children are more likely 
to be removed from an abused parent’s custody to protect the 
child’s physical safety.  In domestic violence courts, on the 
other hand, judges are likely to adopt a more favorable position 
toward domestic violence survivors, in that the abused party 
is seen less as a victim and more as a capable caretaker. This 
is especially true in jurisdictions where more services exist 
to help victims become self-sustaining, as custody in those 
jurisdictions appears more likely to be awarded to the non-
abusive parent as part of  the rehabilitation process. 
II. Specialization: The Domestic Violence 
             and Juvenile and Courts
Domestic Violence Courts 
 “Domestic violence courts,” as the name implies, are 
specialized courts that adjudicate cases involving domestic 
violence.  The Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”) (Title 
IV of  the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act 
of  1994)5 routed substantial funds into the nation’s court 
systems and other areas of  criminal justice to demand more 
accountability from domestic violence perpetrators and to 
provide help and safety to victims.6  Beginning in the 1990s, 
courts nationwide began to allocate special court sessions 
and other procedural resources for domestic violence cases.7
These “domestic violence courts” were deemed necessary, 
in part, to handle the growing number of  domestic violence 
cases as arrests for partner abuse became mandatory and 
as district attorneys faced increasing pressure to prosecute 
such crimes.8  There are currently more than 300 courts 
family than run the risk of  abuse.  As here, evidence of  intimate 
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with special procedures in place to handle domestic violence 
matters.9  The goals of  specialized domestic violence courts 
around the country have been relatively uniform and include 
protecting and empowering domestic violence survivors10 in 
addition to holding perpetrators accountable.11  Improving 
case management efficiency is also often cited as a goal.12
Domestic violence courts vary greatly in structure.13 
Some domestic violence courts may hear only requests for civil 
restraining orders, while others may adjudicate all issues—such 
as restraining orders, criminal charges, and divorce and custody 
issues—for a single family when domestic violence is involved. 
The term “domestic violence court” can encompass anything 
from specialized intake processes to an actual separate court 
system dedicated to domestic violence cases.14  For example, 
in 1987, the Quincy District Court in Quincy, Massachusetts 
began its Domestic Violence Prevention Program, a procedural 
system designed to efficiently address domestic violence 
cases.  Although not a separate court, the program integrated 
a network of  judges, clerks, police officers, prosecutors, 
perpetrator’s intervention programs, and other agencies to 
streamline the system in which victims and perpetrators of  
domestic violence would have their problems addressed.15 In 
2001, Massachusetts instituted its first (and only) domestic 
violence court in Dorchester.16
Generally, domestic violence courts will, at a minimum, 
hold specialized sessions for restraining orders and other civil 
matters involving intimate partner violence. Special attention 
will also be afforded to victims. Elena Salzman describes what 
a victim can expect in the Quincy District Court:
When a woman comes to the Quincy 
District Court seeking a restraining 
order, her first contact will likely be 
with a domestic abuse clerk in the 
Restraining Orders Office. The Quincy 
Program innovators felt that the 
establishment of  a separate restraining 
orders office would be more conducive 
to providing the one-on-one assistance 
women need to fill out the proper 
paperwork. . . .  A woman entering the 
court is often confused, scared, and 
uncertain. The clerks help provide the 
security a woman needs to embark on 
the intimidating process of  requesting 
a restraining order. 
Many of  the domestic abuse clerks in 
Quincy are volunteer interns from law 
schools and social work programs at 
local universities. Their duties include 
disseminating: a sheet listing the 
critical information the woman should 
provide to the assisting clerk; 
a sheet detailing procedures on how 
to file a drug/alcohol petition; and 
an informational brochure entitled 
“Help and Protection for Families 
Experiencing Violence in the Home,” 
which includes a list of  emergency 
resources. 
After the initial intake procedure, 
domestic abuse clerks refer the woman 
to the daily briefing sessions hosted by 
the District Attorney’s Office. During 
these sessions, women not only receive 
information about referral services and 
their legal rights, but they also receive 
emotional support. After the briefing, 
a clerk accompanies a woman to the 
courtroom for her emergency hearing, 
which is usually conducted ex parte, 
without the batterer or his counsel 
present. Often the clerk will stand 
with the woman before the bench to 
provide moral support. 17
 
Domestic violence courts have received widespread 
praise for reducing case filings related to violence between 
intimate partners.18  Victims also appear to be generally satisfied 
with their court experiences and the adjudication process.19 
However, specialized domestic violence courts are not without 
critics. Some argue that such courts are victim-oriented and 
focus so heavily on holding perpetrators accountable that 
there is a bias in favor of  alleged victims.20  The criminal 
defense bar has been especially concerned, complaining that 
“judicial education about family abuse and extended tenure 
on a calendar devoted to such cases creates a pro-victim, anti-
defense bias.”21  
I interviewed a local Boston defense attorney who 
represents alleged abusers.  She strongly echoed the sentiment 
that Dorchester Domestic Violence Court judges are “much 
harder” on defendants than their district court counterparts, 
often denying bail or setting bail much higher than defendants 
can afford.  In her opinion, this placed an unreasonable burden 
on defendants and resulted in differential treatment across 
courts.22  It is perhaps unsurprising that a local prosecutor in 
the Suffolk County Domestic Violence Unit held a different 
opinion.  Domestic violence courts, she reasoned, appropriately 
recognize the danger that perpetrators of  domestic violence 
pose to victims and to society-at-large.  In her view, the 
seriousness with which domestic violence crimes have been 
treated in these specialized courts is a model for the district 
courts to follow.23
 Internal criticism also exists. Domestic violence judges 
themselves have cited increased workloads and emotional 
burnout as disadvantages of  specialization.24  Externally, some 
have expressed concern that domestic violence courts usurp 
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the power of  the legislature by enforcing court-made domestic 
violence policy.25   
Finally, confusion sometimes arises where district 
court domestic violence programs lack jurisdiction over 
certain matters, resulting in conflicting orders between courts. 
Massachusetts, for example, solved this problem by giving the 
Dorchester Domestic Violence Court jurisdiction over criminal 
and civil matters in domestic violence cases.26
Juvenile Courts
 Juvenile courts are not new to the judicial system. 
Special courts to adjudicate child neglect and delinquency 
cases originated more than one hundred years ago, in Cook 
County, Illinois, and all states now have a juvenile court 
system.27  Juvenile courts have broad jurisdiction over matters 
involving children.  The special subject matter jurisdiction of  
any particular state’s juvenile court system is proscribed by state 
statute,28 and usually includes adjudicating child welfare cases 
(regarding child care and protection), delinquency cases, and 
issues involving children in need of  services.29 In all contexts, 
the mandate of  the juvenile court is to protect the best interests 
of  the subject child.30  
The juvenile court system is grounded in the philosophy 
that “when parents are unable to care for or discipline a child, 
it becomes the state’s duty to intervene on the child’s behalf. 
This is the  [concept] called parens patriae.”31 The ultimate 
goal of  the juvenile courts, therefore, is to protect the interests 
of  the child, even when the child’s interests conflict with the 
fundamental liberty interest of  parents in the care, custody 
and control of  their children.32  This emphasis on the child’s 
interest in remaining safe from harm  is especially important 
in the context of  intimate partner violence, where one parent, 
though “fit” in other ways, may be viewed as unable to protect 
the child.33
The Importance of  Specialized Knowledge in Domestic Violence Cases
 Domestic violence cases can present special problems 
to judges.34  Because domestic violence is common and likely 
to be relevant to many legal actions,35 it is advisable that 
judges and court staff  receive specialized training.36  Because 
decisions about custody are among the most important 
decisions made in the judicial system,37 and there is a strong 
probability that domestic violence will be considered as a factor 
in those decisions, training in domestic violence is especially 
important for judges38 who make decisions regarding custody 
and visitation.39  Most states require the court to consider 
domestic violence issues when awarding custody and visitation 
rights.40  Without knowledge of  the particular dynamics of  
each situation involving intimate partner violence, judges 
may be misled by information received in court.  Victims of  
domestic violence often make poor witnesses.41  The trauma 
experienced by victims may manifest itself  as nervousness, 
timidity, and body language that may be perceived as suspect 
or deceptive by the judge.42  In addition “[w]ithout . . . 
understanding of  the dynamics of  intimate partner violence, 
a judge may question the ability of  an individual to tolerate 
such severe acts of  violence. . . . As a result, a judge may 
question the actual level of  violence or the victim’s motives 
if  she remained in the abusive relationship. . .”43  Abusers, 
on the other hand, are often confident and self-controlled, 
giving an appearance of  reliability and truthfulness in court.44 
Despite appearances, abusers can be, and often are, “master 
manipulators.”45  Domestic violence includes “tactics [that] are 
more than physical violence and include a penumbra of  threats 
and actions to induce fear, humiliation, social isolation and 
resource deprivation. Batterers cast aspersions on the moral 
character, parenting and mental health of  battered women to 
discredit them with those who might intervene.”46  Moreover, 
although a batterer may appear calm and trustworthy on the 
stand, he likely still presents a danger to his victim, even when 
they no longer reside in the same home.  Indeed, the most 
dangerous period for an abused woman47 is immediately after 
separation, when her abuser may—in a panic—take desperate 
measures to regain control.48
 Victims may also not be seen in a favorable light when 
a judge evaluates the best interests of  the child for custody 
purposes.49  Best interest factors focus on the stability and 
security of  the child’s environment, putting domestic violence 
victims at a disadvantage.50 Victims are often dependent on 
their abusers for housing, income and other forms of  support.51 
Consequently, separation from her batterer may leave a mother 
without immediate access to a job and financial resources.  As 
noted by Betsy McAlister Groves:
When a mother decides to leave 
her partner, the children’s situation 
may actually worsen.  Mothers (and 
children) are at continued or increased 
risk of  being harmed after they make 
the decision to leave the relationship.  
The batterer often reacts with anger, 
disbelief, and increased attempts to 
control the woman’s relationship.  
Many women we have seen in the 
Child Witness to Violence Project 
described escalating danger as their 
partners attempted, sometimes 
through desperate means, to find them 
and persuade them to return home. 52
Taken together, these patterns are not intuitive.  Special 
knowledge on the part of  judges and others in the criminal 
justice system is therefore needed to effectively address the 
special problems of  families affected by domestic violence.
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        III. The Domestic Violence Courts
As noted above, the domestic violence courts are 
victim-oriented. These courts protect and empower victims 
and hold abusers accountable for their violent behavior.53  In 
addition, because judges in domestic violence courts 
have specialized knowledge regarding domestic violence, they 
are much more likely to grasp the patterns and complexities 
involved where violence occurs in the home.54  This is not only 
because judges and other court officers hear domestic violence 
cases so frequently, but also because judges often receive 
specialized training and tend to engage in frequent dialogue 
regarding the functioning of  the courts, how parties are being 
served, and how the court system could do better.55
 As a result of  specialized knowledge, judges in 
domestic violence courts are likely to perceive victims as logical 
and capable people, rather than as “battered women” trapped 
in a “cycle of  violence.”  While the learned helplessness 
concept of  Battered Women’s Syndrome56 still pervades the 
general court system, judges in the domestic violence courts 
have greater exposure to the currently recognized variation in 
survivor personalities, capabilities, and resources. They are less 
likely to become caught up in the mental trap described by two 
legal scholars below:
Lawyers and judges subscribing to the 
‘Why doesn’t she just leave?’ theory 
too often ignore the battered woman’s 
experience-based determination that 
leaving may be more dangerous to 
her and the child than staying.  As a 
result, battered women seeking justice 
in a family law context may well face 
two unnerving consequences:  more 
abuse from the batterer and state 
coercive authority to remove her 
children against her will on grounds 
that a ‘traumatized’ person is less fit to 
care for her children than the parent 
who is responsible for the abuse.  The 
critical family law assumption clouds 
the legal system’s capacity to see that 
the victimized parent’s decision may 
have a secure foundation – that the 
victimized parent is indeed capable of  
complex thinking and acting, including 
performing subtle acts of  compliance, 
resistance, and direct action to further 
her own and her children’s safety and 
autonomy in the world in which she 
lives. 57
 In practice, it is certainly much easier to allow custody 
to remain with the logical, capable mother described above than 
with a helpless victim.  In this light, survivors are more likely to 
be seen as capable caretakers.  Domestic violence courts tend 
to adopt the “criminal law facet of  domestic violence,” which 
“recognizes that one intimate partner is a perpetrator and one 
is a victim . . . and seeks to hold the perpetrator accountable.” 58 
In contrast, family law views conflict in terms of  two intimate 
partners who must find ways to cooperatively regulate their 
relationship and their family affairs.  Because the juvenile court 
focuses so intently on the child, it is reasonable to believe that 
juvenile court judges are more inclined toward the “family law” 
perspective.
                      IV.     The Juvenile Courts
As noted above, the goal of  any case in the juvenile 
court is to protect the best interests of  the child.  As one 
Boston juvenile court judge indicated,59 he and his fellow 
judges make the physical and emotional safety of  the 
child paramount. They act on the demands articulated in 
Vaughn,60 removing the child where it is possible that the 
child may suffer physical or emotional harm as a result of  
domestic violence in the home.61  
 Given the ways in which the juvenile court typically 
functions, it is not surprising that children would be removed 
from homes in which domestic violence occurs.  First, the 
juvenile court relies strongly on department of  social services 
expertise.62  The department is invariably a party in abuse and 
neglect cases, and will take a position on whether it believes the 
child should be removed from the home.  As one commentator 
notes, child welfare departments often have a checkered history 
in terms of  domestic violence cases,63 at least from the point 
of  view of  domestic violence victims.64  She describes these 
views as follows:65
[O]pponents claim that child protective 
involvement in cases of  childhood 
exposure to domestic violence typically 
has not served the best interests of  
children or their abused caregivers. 
Opponents argue that such intervention 
traditionally has been ineffective, 
discriminatory, and destructive, 
endangering the safety of  adult victims 
and their children, blaming battered 
women for their children’s exposure, 
and reflexively removing children 
from their abused parent’s custody. 
Finally, opponents argue that not all 
children exposed to domestic violence 
are harmed by their exposure, and thus 
intrusive government intervention 
and its negative concomitants will be 
extended to many families where such 
intervention is unnecessary.
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Domestic violence courts and juvenile courts, while both 
“speciality courts,” approach issues of  child custody and 
domestic violence from very different perspectives.  Juvenile 
courts, charged with protecting the child’s best interests, are 
likely to err on the side of  caution by removing children from 
homes in which domestic violence is evident.  These orders 
are based largely on social science data showing the emotional 
and psychological harm to children who witness violence in 
the home, and on a desire to safeguard the child from physical 
harm.  Domestic violence courts, on the other hand, are strongly 
victim-oriented and are more likely to provide services meant 
to facilitate continued custody with the non-offending parent. 
This approach more accurately reflects the social science 
understanding of  domestic violence phenomena, the strength 
and resilience of  survivors, and their competence as caregivers. 
More broadly, since the divergent perspectives of  these two 
specialty courts are likely to result in very different decisions 
regarding child custody in domestic violence situations, family 
integrity very much depends on the court in which each family 
finds itself.  
My own conversations with local attorneys support 
this view.  One victim advocate opined that the Massachusetts 
Department of  Children and Families (“DCF”) is extremely 
quick to take custody of  children whose mothers are abused 
following a report of  a domestic disturbance.66 A local defense 
attorney vigorously agreed, saying that “DCF seems to show 
up as soon as an incident is reported to the police.  Before a 
victim can even get a restraining order, her kids are in DCF 
custody.”67  Whether or not these accounts exaggerate, it is 
logical to assume that child welfare agencies, like 
the courts, err on the side of  caution to prevent physical 
harm to the child.  It is not unlikely that judges are heavily 
influenced by child welfare departments in court, particularly 
when the alternative is to risk putting a child in a dangerous 
environment.  Courts and child welfare agencies have a shared 
policy goal to protect the child,68 suggesting that judges defer 
to agency expertise where the legitimacy of  a child removal 
action is considered.  It is reasonable to assume that this would 
be particularly true where the alternative to removal is to leave 
a child at risk in a dangerous environment.
Scholar Lois Weithorn69 argues that courts have 
generally deferred to child welfare agency removal actions and 
have historically 
“blame[d] these women for any negative 
ramifications of  their abuse for their children; 
remove[d] children from their mothers’ 
custody when doing so [was] not necessary 
for the child’s protection; fail[ed] to hold 
the abuser accountable for his conduct; and 
fail[ed] to provide any services that contribute 
to the short-or long-term well-being of  the 
child or the nonabusive parent.”70
However, juvenile court judge concerns for the safety 
of  the child are based in fact.  For example, children in homes 
in which intimate partner violence occurs are at increased risk 
for physical harm.71  Between 30 % and 60 % of  children whose 
mothers are abused are likely to suffer abuse themselves.72   It 
is also true that children who witness domestic violence are 
more likely to develop emotional and psychological problems, 
show aggressive behavior, and are more likely to exhibit signs 
of  post-traumatic stress disorder and depression.73  It is unclear 
whether these effects occur as a result of  the child witnessing 
violence, from the abuser’s dysfunctional parenting patterns in 
general, or from a combination of  both.74   However, social 
science studies seem to support the proposition that these 
problems can be counteracted to a great extent by a stable and 
loving relationship with the non-abusive parent.75  If  the goal 
is to secure the best possible situation for each child, a pattern 
of  removing children from both parents, rather than just the 
abuser, seems counterproductive.76 
V.   Conclusion
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